This paper analyzes the effect of the 2002 German federal elections to the Lower House of Parliament (Bundestag) on the financial performance of German energy corporations. We consider the last minute victory of the government coalition consisting of Social Democrats and the Green party which was generally associated with a major shift in energy policy towards the promotion of renewable energies and a phasing out of nuclear energy. Our event study approach is based on the application of the Fama-French three-factor model to estimate abnormal stock returns. The results of the empirical analysis imply neither for traditional utilities nor for renewable energy corporations any robust positive or negative impact of the elections and therefore of the general energy policy direction of the government in the next legislative period.
Introduction
The 2002 German federal elections to the Lower House of Parliament (Bundestag) were excitedly awaited and their results were fully unpredictable. Previous to the ballots, the acting government consisting of Social Democrats (SPD) and the Green party (Bü ndnis 90/Die Grü nen) was considered to have about the same chance to win the majority in the Bundestag as the opposition consisting of Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Liberal party (FDP). The so-called "red-green" government coalition finally celebrated a last minute victory over their "black-yellow" opponents, although at nearly the slightest possible margin (1.2 percent points of total votes, Gabriel/Vö lkl 2003) . The election results were especially important for energy policy: The "red-green" coalition was gener-ally associated with a major shift in energy policy towards the promotion of renewable energies and a phasing out of nuclear energy. In contrast, the "black-yellow" opposition signaled different priorities especially assigning an important role to nuclear power.
Against this background, we analyze the hypothesis that the governmental energy policy would have imposed significant costs for German traditional utilities involved in nuclear energy, so that their profitability was hurt. In contrast, the announced withdrawal of the nuclear power law by the "black-yellow" opposition could have broadened the activity fields of traditional utilities. Furthermore, we examine whether German corporations exclusively engaged in renewable energies would have financially profited from these election results. The further promotion of renewable energies by the "red-green" coalition compared with the "black-yellow" opposition, for example, by means of guaranteed feed-in tariffs which eliminate both price and volume risks for this type of energy (Agnolucci 2005 , Mitchell et al. 2006 , could be expected to improve the financial performance of these corporations. Methodologically, the micro-econometric analysis of the impacts of general energy policy on corporate economic performance is rather difficult. Using financial market data, we apply an event study approach. This aims to measure the effect of a specific event on the value of a corporation (MacKinley 1997 , Kothari/Warner 2006 . In this respect, stock returns can be used as indicators for financial performance by arguing that stock prices fully reflect all available information on efficient capital markets (Fama 1970) and thus the discounted expected future cash flows of the respective corporation. Event studies have been rarely used to examine the impact of energy policy (one exception is Diltz 2002) since this methodology requires that the analyzed event was not anticipated before. Indeed, many energy regulations are debated in the political arena over a long time, so that accompanying wealth effects generally are gradually incorporated into the value of a corporation (Binder 1985) . In this respect, event study analyses of elections (Butler/ McNertney 1991 , Kahn/Knittel 2003 , which are expected to affect energy policy and whose results are uncertain, seem to be attractive. We specifically apply the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) to estimate the abnormal stock returns in our event study of the 2002 Bundestag elections. In spite of the superiority of this multifactor model for the explanation of (portfolio) stock returns, event studies mostly use the CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model, Sharpe 1964 , Lintner 1965 ) and the market model (Sharpe 1963 , Fama 1968 ) so far. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the conceptual and theoretical background for our working hypotheses. In Section 3 we present the applied event study methodology. Section 4 describes the used data and details of our event study. In Section 5 we discuss the estimation results and Section 6 concludes.
Background
After the 1998 Bundestag elections the German Green party participated in the national government for the first time in history. The leading party of the corresponding "redgreen" coalition were the Social Democrats. This government coalition was generally associated with a paradigm shift in energy policy as it was already formulated in the contract stating the political agenda of the coalition. Two major goals for the legislative period of the "red-green" coalition were the promotion of renewable energies and a phasing out of nuclear energy. These goals already formed part of the officially announced program for the first 100 days of the government ("100-Tage-Programm").
Although the "red-green" government coalition failed to implement this energy policy as quickly, it achieved at least a fundamental change until the end of the legislative period (Mez 2003) . For example, the "Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz" ("EEG") -a law institutionalizing the promotion of renewable energies -from March 2000 sets technology specific feed-in tariffs above the prices for generating electricity from fossil fuels (e.g. coal or gas), while at the same time power distributors were obliged to buy this power, so that both price and volume risks for this type of energy were eliminated (Agnolucci 2005 , Mitchell et al. 2006 . Moreover, negotiations between the government and the power supply industry ("Energiekonsensgesprä che") led in June 2000 to an agreement ("Atomkonsens") and in April 2002 to the amendment of a nuclear power law ("Atomgesetz"). According to this, the operation of existing nuclear power plants was restricted to an average regular duration of 32 years without financial compensation of the affected utilities and, furthermore, the future construction of new nuclear power plants was legally dispelled (for a detailed historical overview of German energy regulations including measures taken by the "red-green" government, see Kern et al. 2004) .
Social Democrats and the Green party therefore stood for a new concept of energy policy regarding a phasing out of nuclear energy and even suggested more pronounced measures towards the promotion of renewable energies -proposing a doubling of the share of renewable energies in overall power generation -in their campaigns for the 2002 Bundestag elections. In contrast, the opposing Christian Democrats and Liberal party signaled different priorities in energy policy and particularly proclaimed the comeback of nuclear power. This "black-yellow" opposition argued that a phasing out of nuclear energy combined with excessive promotion of renewable energies could, on the one hand, increase electricity prices for households and industry and, on the other hand, make it expensive to reach long-term German climate policy goals.
According to this, the first working hypothesis for our empirical analysis is that the governmental energy policy would have imposed significant costs for German traditional utilities involved in nuclear energy, so that the victory of the "red-green" coalition in the 2002 Bundestag elections would have led to negative effects on their corporate financial performance, measured by stock returns. Furthermore, the previous discussion implies that German renewable energy corporations would have financially profited from the "red-green" support of this type of energy and therefore from the election results. In other words, our second working hypothesis refers to positive abnormal stock returns for this group of energy corporations. Due to the corresponding negative incentives for economic activities in the traditional utilities sector and positive incentives for respective activities in the renewable energies sector, the 2002 Bundestag elections and the associated energy policy could thus have supported or strengthened -at least in the long-run -a sub-sectoral shift in German electricity generation.
These hypotheses are based on the assumption that the energy policy of the Social Democrats and the Green party was not anticipated by the capital markets before the fully unpredictable results of the 2002 Bundestag elections. However, it should be noted thatas discussed above -the government coalition already formulated its energy policy at the beginning of its first legislative period in 1998 in the contract stating the political agenda of the coalition and in the following passed some corresponding laws. Therefore, it was possible for traditional utilities to adjust their corporate policy in a way to hedge against all possible election results, for example, by investing in renewable energies and technologies. In this case, the compliance costs of German phasing out of nuclear energy could have been rather modest for this group of energy corporations profiting from the corresponding feed-in tariffs, which eliminate both price and volume risks for renewable energy generation as aforementioned. Another reason which rather suggests the weakening of any negative abnormal return are the long average remaining times to maturity of the existing nuclear power plants of 32 years. Furthermore, possible compliance costs could have been entirely borne by the final consumers of electricity also due to their low price elasticity of demand (Diltz 2002 , Kahn/Knittel 2003 . Similarly, it was already possible for renewable energy corporations to react on the "redgreen" energy policy before the 2002 Bundestag elections, for example, in the time period of the planning and formulation of the "EEG". This could also have had a moderating effect on any possible (positive) abnormal return. In this respect, it should be mentioned that investments of energy corporations generally have a longer time horizon than only the four years of a (German) legislative period. Finally, it should be noted that both renewable energy corporations and especially traditional utilities operate abroad, so that the impact of national energy policy could further be moderated.
As discussed above, the micro-econometric analysis of the effects of several energy regulations on corporate economic performance is very difficult. As a consequence, it is especially not possible for us to disentangle the different reasons which could have weakened possible negative or positive abnormal returns. Our event study therefore does not analyze the financial impacts of specific energy policies, but whether the result of the 2002 Bundestag elections and therefore the general energy policy direction of the "red-green" coalition compared with their "black-yellow" opponents in the next legislative period had an impact on the financial performance of German energy corporations.
Event study methodology
Using financial market data, event studies examine the stock return behavior for corporations which experience a specific event and therefore aim to measure the effect on the value of a corporation (MacKinley 1997 , Kothari/Warner 2006 . One important assumption of such approaches is that capital markets are sufficiently efficient to react on events, i.e. on new and surprising information regarding expected future profits of corporations. Event studies are mostly rested upon the analysis of so-called "normal" and "abnormal" stock returns which are estimated on the basis of asset pricing models. The main traditional approaches are the market model (Sharpe 1963 , Fama 1968 ) and the one-factor model based on the CAPM (Sharpe 1964 , Lintner 1965 .
However, many studies show that the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) , which includes -in the same way as the one-factor model -the excess returns R mt À R ft for the market portfolio, but also two additional factors, to explain the excess returns R it À R ft for a stock (or stock portfolio) i, has more explanatory power than the onefactor model, for example, French (1993, 1996) for the U.S., Berkowitz and Qiu (2001) for the Canadian, Hussain et al. (2002) for the British, and Ziegler et al. (2007) for the German stock market. The structure of this three-factor model for a corporation or stock i in period (i.e. day) t is as follows (i ¼ 1; :::; N; t ¼ 1; :::; T):
In this model R it and R mt are the returns for corporation i and the market portfolio at the end of day t and R ft is the risk-free interest rate at the beginning of day t. SMB t is the difference between the returns for a portfolio comprising stocks of "small" corporations and a portfolio comprising stocks of "big" corporations. HML t is the difference between the returns for a portfolio comprising stocks of corporations with a "high" book-tomarket equity and a portfolio comprising stocks of corporations with a "low" bookto-market equity, respectively, in day t (for details see Fama/French 1993) . While e it is the disturbance term with Eðe it Þ ¼ 0, the parameters varðe it Þ ¼ r 2 e ; a i ; b i ; s i , and h i are unknown and have to be estimated (by OLS). It should be noted that we do not consider two additional bond market factors (related to the term spread and default risk) in a five-factor model as suggested in Fama and French (1993) since they have no additional explanatory power for the German stock market (Ziegler et al. 2007 ).
While the unknown normal (excess) returns K it are defined as the expected (excess) returns without conditioning on the event, the abnormal returns AR it are defined as the difference between the actual and the normal (excess) returns:
The unknown parameters in K it are estimated on the basis of the three-factor model over all days t in the time interval [T 0 ; :::; T 1 ] ("estimation window"). Based on this, the normal and abnormal returns are estimated for each corporation i and for separate days t in the time interval [T 1 þ 1; :::; T 2 ] ("event window"). The estimated abnormal returns est(AR it ) are:
If the estimation window is sufficiently large, the est(AR it ) are approximately normally distributed with expectation zero and variance var½estðAR it Þ ¼ r 2 e under the null hypothesis H 0 that the event has no impact on the (excess) returns.
The estimated abnormal returns can be aggregated across corporations and over time. For an aggregation across affected corporations, the estimated average abnormal returns est(AAR t ) for a day t in the event window are the means of the estimated abnormal returns for the corporations i ¼ 1; :::; N:
For an aggregation over time, the estimated cumulative abnormal returns estðCAR i Þ for a corporation i are the sums of the considered estimated abnormal returns over all days t from T a to T b (with T 1 < T a < T b < T 2 þ 1):
For a combined aggregation over time and across affected corporations, the estimated average cumulative abnormal returns est(ACAR) are (besides the alternative calculation of the sums of the estimated average abnormal returns over time from T a to T b ) the means of the estimated cumulative abnormal returns for the corporations i ¼ 1; :::; N:
If the estimated (cumulative) abnormal returns are independent across corporations and/or over time and if the estimation window is sufficiently large, the estðAAR t Þ, estðCAR i Þ, and estðACARÞ are approximately normally distributed with expectation zero as well as var½estðAAR t Þ ¼ r 2 e =N, var½estðCAR i Þ ¼ r 2 e ðT b À T a þ 1Þ, and var½estðACARÞ ¼ ½r 2 e ðT b À T a þ 1Þ=N, respectively, under the null hypothesis H 0 that the event has no effect.
In our event study we analyze both individual and aggregated abnormal returns. In this respect, it should be noted that the assumption of estimated (cumulative) abnormal returns being independent across corporations could be violated due to event-time clustering since we analyze the effect of one singular event. As a consequence, the estimated variances of the estimated average abnormal returns estðAAR t Þ and of the estimated average cumulative abnormal returns estðACARÞ could be biased downward (Bernard 1987 , Kothari/Warner 2006 . Furthermore, event-induced variance according to Boehmer et al. (1991) could be a problem for estðAAR t Þ. This may result in rejecting the null hypothesis of no event impact based on estimated average (cumulative) abnormal returns too often (we will turn to this problem below). In contrast, tests based on estimated abnormal returns estðAR it Þ and on estimated cumulative abnormal returns estðCAR i Þ are not problematic in this respect. Based on z-statistics, which directly arise from the approximated normal distributions of estðAR it Þ, estðAAR t Þ, estðCAR i Þ, and estðACARÞ under H 0 , we can examine whether the 2002 Bundestag elections actually had an effect on stock returns. We consider several days after the elections as it is common in many event studies. According to Kothari and Warner (2006) , this analysis permits precise measurements of abnormal stock returns. Based on the assumption that capital markets are sufficiently efficient, they should react within a very short-term horizon (i.e. within the first day) after the elections since the new information is immediately available.
Data and details of the event study
In our event study we consider two groups of German energy corporations: Traditional utilities involved in nuclear energy and corporations exclusively engaged in renewable energies. Regarding the first group, financial data for the calculation of stock returns for overall N ¼ 5 corporations are available, namely for ENBW, EON, MVV, RWE, and VATTENFALL. Regarding the second group, corresponding data for overall N ¼ 7 corporations are available, namely for EECH, ENERGIEKONTOR, NORDEX, SOLAR-PARC, SOLARWORLD, SUNWAYS, and UMWELTKONTOR. Our financial data stem from a carefully controlled database for German stock corporations of Richard Stehle from Humboldt University Berlin, Germany (Stehle/Hartmond 1991 , Schulz/Stehle 2002 . The data contain the (discrete) stock returns R it and R mt (in %) for the aforementioned energy corporations and for the German market portfolio which comprises all stocks traded on the Frankfurt stock exchange. To calculate the two risk factors SMB t and HML t for the estimation of the Fama-French three-factor model, the data also contain the market and book values of all corporations whose stocks are traded on the Frankfurt stock exchange, except banks and insurances as well as stock corporations with negative book values (for details see Ziegler et al. 2007 ). The risk-free interest rates R ft (in %) are based on the corresponding benchmarks for the money and capital markets in the euro zone. Our analyzed event date is September 22, 2002, i.e. the date the Bundestag elections took place. We define the 120 trading days prior to this event as our estimation window [T 0 ; :::; T 1 ]. Therefore, T 0 ¼ T 1 À 119 represents April 5 and T 1 represents September 20. This window is used for the estimation of the unknown parameters a i , b i , s i , and h i in the Fama-French three-factor model. Based on the corresponding parameter estimates estða i Þ, estðb i Þ, estðs i Þ, and estðh i Þ, the abnormal returns are estimated for the i ¼ 1; :::; 5 traditional utilities and the i ¼ 1; :::; 7 renewable energy corporations. It should be noted that we do not follow the procedure of some other (e.g. environmental) event studies which incorporate some days before the event into the event window. This approach is justified if a leakage of information to investors before the information was fully revealed to the public -at the event day -is possible. For example, Konar and Cohen (1997) and Khanna et al. (1998) consider the impact of the public disclosure of corporate emissions on the financial performance of the concerned corporations. By ending the estimation window ten days before the event and considering the abnormal returns for some days around the event day, they analyze the possibility that such corporate environmental information was already available for some investors before the event day. In contrast, this procedure is obviously inappropriate for our study because a leakage of information to investors before the event day is impossible since the results of elections cannot be known prior to the elections. We have nevertheless analyzed the average cumulative abnormal returns over the ten trading days before the 2002 Bundestag elections (i.e. from September 9 to September 20) to test the robustness of our consideration (naturally on the basis of an appropriate estimation window that ends at September 6). As expected, and thus in line with our argumentation, these ACAR are neither for the five traditional utilities involved in nuclear energy nor for the seven corporations exclusively engaged in renewable energies different from zero at any common level of significance (these additional estimation results are available upon request). As a consequence, we specifically consider the 15 trading days after the 2002 Bundestag elections on September 22 as the event window [T 1 þ 1; :::; T 2 ]. While T 1 þ 1 thus represents September 23, T 2 represents October 11. In this event window all individual abnormal returns AR it are estimated. In contrast, the average abnormal returns AAR t for the five traditional utilities and for the seven renewable energy corporations, respectively, are only estimated for t ¼ T 1 þ 1. Furthermore, we estimate some cumulative abnormal returns CAR i . While T a is always T 1 þ 1, we consider different time intervals, so that T b varies between T 1 þ 2, T 1 þ 5, and T 1 þ 15 and therefore the analyzed length of time intervals varies between two, five, and 15 days. Additionally, we estimate the average cumulative abnormal returns ACAR for the three aforementioned time intervals. Table 1 reports summary statistics of the estimation results regarding abnormal returns for September 23 -the day after the 2002 Bundestag elections -for the five traditional utilities involved in nuclear energy. Furthermore, the table shows estimation results regarding cumulative abnormal returns for the different time intervals as defined above as well as the estimated average abnormal return for September 23 and respective estimated average cumulative abnormal returns. Table A1 in the appendix additionally reports for each of the five traditional utilities the corresponding estimated abnormal returns for each of the 15 trading days after the ballots as well as the respective estimated cumulative abnormal returns.
Estimation results
According to these tables, the average abnormal returns for September 23 and the average cumulative abnormal returns for the first two, five, and 15 days after the elections across all corporations do not differ from zero at any common level of significance. Instead, even positive estðAR it Þ arise for three out of the five traditional utilities for September 23 (so that the identity of the number of positive or negative estimated abnormal returns cannot be rejected at any common level of significance according to the corresponding sign test) and positive estðCAR i Þ even arise for each of the traditional utilities from September 23 to September 27. However, a significant cumulative abnormal return for the first two, five, or 15 days after the ballots does not occur for any of the five traditional utilities. According to these estimation results, there is no evidence for a negative impact of the 2002 Bundestag elections on stock returns and therefore on the financial performance of the traditional utilities.
Just like Table 1 for the five traditional utilities involved in nuclear energy, Table 2 reports for the seven corporations exclusively engaged in renewable energies summary statistics of the estimation results regarding abnormal returns for September 23 and regarding cumulative abnormal returns for the above defined time intervals. Furthermore, the table shows the estimated average abnormal return for September 23 and the respective estimated average cumulative abnormal daily returns. Additionally, Table A2 in the appendix -just like Table A1 for the traditional utilities -reports for each of the seven renewable energy corporations the respective estimated abnormal returns for each of the 15 trading days after the elections as well as the corresponding estimated cumulative abnormal returns. According to these tables, positive estðAR it Þ for September 23 arise for six out of the seven renewable energy corporations and the average abnormal return for September 23 differs from zero at the 1 % level of significance. Furthermore, a significant average cumulative abnormal return from September 23 to September 24 occurs. However, a short-term overreaction of the stock markets is possible since the average cumulative abnormal returns for the first five and 15 days after the elections do not differ from zero at any common level of significance. It should also be noted that the clearly positive estðAAR t Þ for September 23 and the positive estðACARÞ from September 23 to September 24 are strongly affected by the estðAR it Þ and estðCAR i Þ for only one corporation, namely SUNWAYS, which suggests a firm-specific effect rather than a general impact on the entire sector. Furthermore, the hypotheses of an identical number of positive and negative estimates estðAR it Þ for September 23 as well as of an equal number of positive and negative estimates estðCAR t Þ from September 23 to September 24 cannot even be rejected at the 10 % level of significance according to the corresponding sign tests.
Finally, these estimation results should indeed be treated with caution: On the one hand, the volatility of the corresponding stock returns is extremely high. On the other hand, these renewable energy corporations are generally characterized by low trades which could lead to errors-in-variables problems.
As discussed above, it could be argued that the assumption of independent estimated abnormal returns across corporations is violated in our study due to event-time clustering with one common event date for all corporations. Furthermore, event-induced variance according to Boehmer et al. (1991) could be a problem. As a consequence, the null hypothesis of no event impact based on estimated average (cumulative) abnormal returns may be rejected too often. However, it should be noted that the main result for both renewable energy corporations and traditional utilities is that this null hypothesis is not rejected at common levels of significance in most cases. Therefore, we abstain from additional robustness checks regarding event-time clustering which do not require the assumption of the independence of estimated abnormal returns across corporations (in this respect, MacKinley 1997, also suggests -besides the analysis of abnormal returns that are not averaged across corporations -the examination of aggregated portfolio returns instead of single stock returns). In contrast, we have applied the alternative test statistic of Boehmer et al. (1991) -addressing event-induced variance -to check the robustness of our results regarding the average abnormal returns for September 23. Indeed, the corresponding test results are qualitatively fully identical with those according to Table 1 and Table 2 since the estimated test statistics are 0.62 for the five traditional utilities and 2.62 for the seven renewable energy corporations. Therefore, both tests imply that the average abnormal return does not differ from zero at any common level of significance for the traditional utilities, but differs from zero at the 1 % level of significance for the renewable energy corporations.
Conclusions
This paper examines the effect of the last minute victory of the acting government consisting of Social Democrats and the Green party in the 2002 German federal elections to the Lower House of Parliament (Bundestag) on stock returns for German energy corporations. The main result of our empirical analysis is that there is no evidence that the election results in favor of the "red-green" government coalition compared with their "black-yellow" opponents had any financial impact. Our event study indicates neither for traditional utilities nor for renewable energy corporations any robust positive or negative abnormal return subsequently to the elections. Methodologically, we apply the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) to estimate the abnormal stock returns. Whereas this multifactor model has obviously more explanatory power for stock returns than the one-factor model based on the CAPM and the market model, event studies mostly use such limited one-factor models so far. To test the robustness of our estimation results, we have nevertheless also applied the traditional one-factor model. The corresponding estimation results (which are available upon request) imply only slight differences to the estimation results as discussed above, so that the main conclusions hold if this simple asset pricing model is applied.
As a consequence, none of our two working hypotheses can be confirmed by our empirical analysis. In other words, neither the hypothesis that the "red-green" energy policy would have imposed significant costs for German traditional utilities involved in nuclear energy, nor the hypothesis that German corporations exclusively engaged in renewable energies would have financially profited from the "red-green" support of this type of energy and therefore from the 2002 Bundestag election results, can be supported. As discussed above, it is not possible to disentangle different possible factors for this result. Therefore, it can only be speculated whether the energy policy of the "red-green" government coalition was already anticipated by the capital markets before the 2002 Bundestag elections, for example, since traditional utilities invested in renewable energies and technologies, or whether the international orientation of energy corporations generally weakens any economic effect of national regulations.
In any case, it should be noted that the German oligopolistic energy market has been (and is) generally highly regulated and that the politically connected energy corporations may have had (and have) a high influence on legislative procedures. This influence has at least been suggested by recent analyses on the political economy of German environmental and energy policy (see Anger et al. 2006 , for the introduction of the ecological tax reform, or Anger et al., 2008 , for the allowance allocation in the EU Emission Trading Scheme). Against this background, the different priorities in energy policy between the "red-green" government and the "black-yellow" opponents in their campaigns for the 2002 Bundestag elections could be considered minor within this general market structure. As a consequence, it could be argued that the economic performance of energy corporations would have been only marginally affected by the different governments, so that no robust effect of the election results on stock returns can be shown. Note: * (**, ***) means that the null hypothesis that the abnormal returns AR it or the cumulative abnormal returns CAR i are zero can be rejected at the 10 % (5 %, 1 %) level of significance (according to the corresponding twotailed z-test) Note: * (**, ***) means that the null hypothesis that the abnormal returns AR it or the cumulative abnormal returns CAR i are zero can be rejected at the 10 % (5 %, 1 %) level of significance (according to the corresponding twotailed z-test)
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